

INTELLOFAX 2

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25X1A

INFORMATION REPORT

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1. As of mid-September 1951, the Chilean Appellate Court, under Magistrate Jose Eyzaguirre, was continuing to hold hearings on the faked kidnapping of Edgardo Maass and Domiciano Soto. Sufficient criminal evidence was then available on the following individuals to implicate them in the case:

Edgardo Maass Jensen
Domiciano Soto
Carlos Alexander Fellenberg Ferrer
Federico Glemza Steele

Principal
Principal
Principal
Accomplice, evidence believed
lacking to classify as prin-
cipal
Accomplice in absentia
Accomplice in absentia
Accomplice in absentia

2. In addition to numerous other persons questioned by the Court, the following persons had been summoned:

Carlos Ibanez del Campo

A former dictator and now presidential candidate, who would have profited most had the plot succeeded, he has been closely interrogated by the Court, which was unable to develop any direct evidence of an overt act on his part to further the plot, other than past association with most of the principals.

Guillermo Izquierdo Araya

A former pro-Nazi, who has long been an ardent supporter of Ibanez, he is very pro-Argentine, is the director of Accion Chileno-Argentina and is closely associated with all of the above persons and accomplices. Although he is highly suspect, there is no evidence regarding his participation in the plot.

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Gen. Ariosto Herrera
A retired, violently pro-Nazi Chilean general, who was the leader of the revolutionary movement in August 1939 against the government, he is at present very pro-Peron and an ardent supporter of Ibanez. Because of his past, and his more recent association with the principals in the present plot, he has been highly suspect, but actual evidence is lacking to date.

Juan Gomez Millas
A leftist-inclined person, he is Vice President of the Centro Cultural Chileno-Hindu, a Communist-front group in Santiago, and he is also a member of the board of the Accion Chileno-Argentina. His name was included on the proposed cabinet list for the new government.

Julio Schwarzenberg
One of the early organizers of the AChA (Accion Chilena Anti-Comunista), he is considered pro-Argentine and pro-Ibanez. He is suspected of implication, but this suspicion has not been confirmed.

Dr. Oscar Avondano
He is a member of the board of the Accion Chileno-Argentina, and in 1947 was Vice-President of AChA. He is considered pro-Peron and pro-Ibanez, and his name is contained in the list for the proposed cabinet in the new government.

Tobias Barros Ortiz
Ex-Chilean Ambassador to Germany, he is considered to be pro-Argentine and pro-Ibanez. His name was included in the proposed cabinet for the new government.

Enrique Caselli Mayo
He was the alleged custodian of the arms cache for the supporters of the plot, which investigation revealed was satisfactorily identified as property of a rifle and pistol club.

Mario Montero Schmidt
Lawyer for Gienna and a nephew of Ibanez, he is also a former pro-Nazi and ardent Ibanista who appeared as Minister of Treasury in the proposed cabinet of the new government.

Eugenio Gonzalez
Senator and Popular Socialist, he has been identified as one of the conspirators because of his plotting with Ibanez, Gienna, and Ramon Verrara Montero in Buenos Aires, although actual evidence is not available at this time to satisfy the Court of his implication. He was on the proposed cabinet list for the new government as Minister of Education.

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3. Carlos A. Fellenberg, alleged "guard" of Eduardo Mass and Domiciano Soto during their pretended kidnapping, had previously revealed that he had become involved with the revolutionary plot through his alleged association with the Accion Democredora de Chile. Subsequent investigation indicated that this organization was purely imaginative and did not exist. Fellenberg's political position is described as being a "pro-Stalin, functional corporationalist" and a follower of Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco. He hates Communism and capitalism equally and believes that Communism is a direct result of the capitalist system. He claims that the United States is directed by a Jewish-Masonic group crazed with world-wide ambitions.
4. Fellenberg's confidential comments on the attempted coup were as follows: On 22 August 1961, he was called by Federico Gienza, previously reported as probable "brain" of the plot and the owner of El Totoral, where Mass, Soto, and Fellenberg were found. Gienza apparently told Fellenberg that a revolutionary plot was being prepared and that the latter's co-operation was needed. Gienza instructed Fellenberg to obtain an automobile and to contact others to take part in the plot. Fellenberg then visited Juan Diego Devila Bastererra, an engineer employed by Endesa, and they discussed the proposed coup for about three hours. Devila promised to obtain the collaboration of Adolfo Moreno Vergara and Enrique Paul Barron, both of whom were also employed by Endesa as engineers. Apparently, Gienza and Devila were friends and had agreed to purchase jointly an airplane for commercial use. Devila is a pilot. During their conversation of 22 August 1961 Gienza informed Fellenberg: "Tomorrow there is to be a mass demonstration in which violent anti-government speeches will be made. It will be the opportunity to take possession of some syndicate leaders and make it appear that the government is responsible for their kidnapping."
5. On 23 August 1961, after the "Hunger March," Fellenberg said that he met with Gienza, Devila, Moreno, and Paul, and together this group went to meet Eduardo Mass, who already was aware of the plot. Then the entire group continued to Domiciano Soto's residence. Soto and his wife attempted to lock the group out, but finally the latter, claiming to be Investigaciones secretas, forced entry into the building and forcibly removed Soto. He was placed in a car with Moreno, Devila, and Fellenberg, and on the road they met a station-wagon in which Mass, Gienza, and Paul were travelling. Once at El Totoral, the hiding place, Soto made no effort to resist his captors; and Mass convinced Soto that he would have to go through with the plot. Soto agreed and became cook for the group.
6. According to Fellenberg, Gienza's plan was to produce a movement of labor agitation which would bring about a change in government, as in February 1959, when Mass directed a similar movement. Gienza apparently was of the opinion that "If the Cabinet falls, all will fall". Had the plot succeeded, according to Fellenberg, the conspirators had previously decided that Mass would be appointed as president of a government junta, with Soto as Minister of Labor and Devila as Minister of Public Works within the junta.
7. On 25 August 1961 Paul, Devila, and Moreno traveled to Buenos Aires by plane. It had become evident at that time that they were implicated in the Mass-Soto affair and would be investigated by the police. In order to avoid an investigation, they escaped to Argentina, from which country they cannot be extradited for a "political offense".
8. A search of Paul's apartment after his departure from Chile revealed the following eight calling cards:

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|---|---|
| Tello Salazar R. Kitzing Domingo Leonor Vero Domingo Travedra Lopez Hermann Furukowski Otto E. Tréman Luis Barasano O. Onofre Jarama | O'Higgins 157, phone 65165, ext. 36 Cirujano Guzman 103, phone 20952 Radio La Pajina, Tenderini 115, 90 N. York 25, 68412, Luis Harnecker Agustinas 1070, 212, 62443 86591 |
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9. A search of Davila's apartment revealed an envelope wrapped with the tricolor cord and insignia of the "Cazadores" Regiment. In Davila's notebook, the name of Jacinto Ochoa Rios, retired Army general, was noted. Also found were 10 documents:

- Document 1: Names of the following reserve officers who attended a meeting at the Union Club on 27 October 1950:
- | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Lt. Colonel | Marcelo Martin Droguett |
| Lt. Colonel | Luis Soto Davies |
| Major | Armando Abarzua Henriquez |
| | Oscar Roman Bonelli |
| Attache Embassy El Salvador | Gerardo Guzman Alverque |
| Major | Enrique Vicuna Correa |
| | Augusto Ubilla |
| Captain | Pedro Serrano Palma |
| | Juan Diego Davila |
| | Patricio Vargas Rivera |
| | Bonico Montenegro Riveros |
- Document 2: Certificate given by Augusto Roman Castro, B. O'Higgins 849, 69082, recommending Carlos Fellenberg Fuxrel as an honorable and industrious person.
- Document 3: Certificate issued by the Banco Feranot-Chile, dated 8 August 1949, saying that this individual was employed by the bank from 2 October 1944 to 2 June 1948, when he voluntarily resigned.
- Document 4: A request presented by Juan Diego Davila Basterria for permission to organize a company to acquire lands in the mountains for summer camps for military personnel of the reserve.
- Document 5: A request presented by Juan Diego Davila Basterria asking for authorization to use the emblem of an air force pilot, inasmuch as he is a Captain of the Reserve and a civil pilot.
- Document 6: A sheet of paper, office-size, with the names of the officers attending the Union Club meeting written in pencil.
- Document 7: "Order of the Day" of the reserves, written by hand by Davila.
- Document 8: A continuation of No. 7.
- Document 9: Academy of Reserve Officers (the same as before).
- Document 10: Various data relating to the reserves.

10. An investigation of the living quarters of the third member of the trio which fled to Argentina revealed that Moreno owned a notebook in which was noted the following:

Talcahuano port:

| | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Luis Basterria G. | Administrator of the Port |
| Rene Roman Shirmer | Cap. of Corbeta, Chief Mobil Naval Base |
| Luis Mazon Castillo | Cap. Fragata, Director of Torpedo School |
| Tomas Donoso G. | Lt. Official Operations Floating Derrick |
| Herman Sotomayor Iberhard | Chief Verification of Customs Section |
| Bernardo Delgado Ruiz | Chief Mobile Administration of Port |
| Maximo Olaverria | Chief Bahia Williamson |

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| Ernesto Smith | Chief Steamships Williamson |
| Honnel Teino | Chief of Customs |
| Oscar Arencibia | Chief of Customs Security |
| Lutero Segura Leon | Customs Administrator |
| Cocuimbo-Ovalls-Holles: | |
| Jorge Rodriguez Polanco | Customs Agent |
| Demiel Salcedo Plummer | Chief Transport and Railroad Yards |
| Bernan Semulveda Flores | Administrator Electric Company |
| David Scott | Central Treasury Los Molles |
| Francisco Pino Cabello | Engineer Los Molles |
| Santiago: | |
| Gabriel Guncio | Machinist Engineer |
| Richard Friebe | Colegio Aleman (German School) |
| Guillermo Izquierdo Araya | Barraflora 509-D.2 |
| Humberto Kemmer | Lourdes 1631 |
| Nilo Rosenberg | Guantanamo 1615 |
| Carlo Giangrandi Gallo | 37 Wall Street, N. York 5 |
| Gustavo Krugger | Casilla 247, Curico |
| Militares varios (Various military people): | |
| Marin | Captain Telecommunication A. Varga |
| Daniel Grey Pizarro | |
| Carlos Barrera Solovora | Major Commandant Reserve Instruction |
| Telecommunication School: | |
| Javier Diaz Bonono | School Director |
| Waldonado | Sub-Director |
| Benzo Kartzon De Vova | Major Commandant Battalion Instruction |
| Herman Marin Borquez | Captain Commandant of Company |
| Sergio Fernandez R. | Lt. Commandant of Section |
| Mario Caspades Aguirre | Lt. Commandant of Section |
| Haniel Oliva Alvarez | Captain Telegraph of the State |
| Alfredo Arriagada | |
| Captain Klenz | |
| Captain Leiva | |
| Lt. Cornejo | |
| Lt. Foto | |
| Lt. Arcos | Adjutant Battalion |
| Vice Ist Gerardo Poblete | |
| Carr. Tito Rilla Blanca | |
| R.C.2: | |
| Gerardo Guzman Alvergue | 33498, La Tranquera 36 |
| Alvaro Levin Sotomayor | 39174, Corte Barrera 171 |
| Isis Sanerot Sanchez | 81731, Paraguay 478 |
| Juan Diego Devila Pastoriza | 86696, R. Mito 920 |
| Carlos Krum Grizar | 64291, Alm. Intorre 435 |
| Juan Casanova Lopez de Aro | 69159, Bradera 46 |
| Jose Bernaldes Pereira | 85595, Invencible Arrada 2900 |
| Antonio Guzman Sanchez | 40922, El Bosque 37. |

11. Dario Poblete Dunez, Secretary General of the Administration, reportedly has recognized privately that the Communist Party was not involved in any way in the Mass-Soto affair, but he feels that the Party would have certainly taken every possible advantage of the affair had it succeeded, because of its anti-government aspects. Poblete believes that Communist leader Miguel Concha Trezada had prior knowledge of the plot and, in fact, may have been more involved than Soto, whom Poblete describes as a mere pawn in the affair. Poblete has stated privately that he was of the opinion that the plot originated in the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) and he added: "The real leader and brain behind the plot was Paul Amuero, Secretary General of the PSP". Reportedly, Amuero was very upset when the PSP was not admitted into the government coalition in June/July 1961, and he became

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determined to force President Gonzalez Videla from office. Further, Poblete explained, after the PSP's failure to enter the government, Ampuero realized that the Popular Socialists could probably control only 3,000 votes in the entire country and he decided that a "coup d'etat" was perhaps the only way to gain influence for his party. Poblete ended: "Ampuero was the director of the plot and Mass only its executor...the Communists knew about this and waited to see its results..."

12. On 25 August 1951, the government had in its possession a list naming the labor leaders who were allegedly about to travel throughout Chile on orders of the Communist faction of the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Chile (CTCh) to prepare for a nation-wide strike for 29 August 1951. Subsequently, it became apparent that the list in the government's possession was fabricated by an unidentified informant and was completely false. Actually, never at any time during that period did the CTCh decide to call a general strike, and no labor leader left Santiago.
13. An internal Chilean Communist Party investigation of its own members and their possible implication in the Mass-Soto incident, has failed to reveal participation of any Communists in that affair, although the Party does not overlook the possibility that Luis Reinoso Alvarez or other ex-Communists might be involved. Reinoso, long considered one of the leading components of the Chilean Communist Party, was expelled from the Party in April 1951 for advocating and leading deviationist policies.
14. The Communist Party's Political Commission reportedly recalled during this investigation that, at the time of Reinoso's expulsion, the importance of the Party's not becoming involved in any coup, which might prove harmful to its prestige before the working masses, was explicitly stated. The Political Commission feels that the Communist Party, as the vanguard of the proletariat, should guide them in their struggles and serve as a rallying point when an actual insurrection occurs, but should hold these same masses back from any such moves which do not hold promise of becoming full-scale revolutions. They differentiate however between the above and, as an example, the hypothetical case of the Army organizing a coup and inviting the Communist Party to take part as a political reinforcement, in which case the Party would certainly accept.
15. The Communists point to the Mass-Soto episode as exemplifying what Lenin called "two steps backwards" for the syndicate movement of labor and white-collar workers. They consider the road ahead very difficult, with the government disposed to wipe out any vestige of a syndical labor movement. It is further noted by the Communists that the political picture was on the verge of a change, and that the Communist Party was waiting and ready to reap the benefits, when the Mass-Soto affair came along to obliterate four years of patient work.
16. As a result, the Communists now feel that they have the multiple problems of overcoming lack of confidence in their leaders by the workers, "fear and terror" of imprisonment, and the "home and family problem", brought about by wives and families urging the workers to stay out of labor and political battles. The Political Commission considers the Mass-Soto incident to be truly catastrophic for the Communist Party.
17. In connection with Guillermo Izquierdo Araya, former pro-Nazi and one of the persons questioned by the Court regarding the Mass-Soto affair, it was ascertained that he was arrested by the Chilean police as an accomplice, since it had been determined by the authorities that he owned the automobile which transported Mass and Soto from Los Cerillos (Santiago airport) to El Totoral, their hideaway. From Santiago to Los Cerillos they travelled

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In Gienza's automobile and were then transferred to Izquierdo's car. Following this disclosure the police raided Izquierdo's office and obtained a copy of a letter sent by Izquierdo to Camilo Sistori of Buenos Aires, Argentina. The address was not disclosed. The letter, translated from Spanish, reads: "Lastly, my dear Mr. Sistori, I beg of you to look after with your usual kindness and generosity three Chilean boys who are in Buenos Aires, having fled from the Chilean police and from our enemies. Because these boys were mixed up in the kidnapping affair and it failed, they were forced to drop everything here and look for refuge and protection in your generous country. I hope that you'll recommend these boys to our friends so that they will not lack food or protection. Because of their bravery, idealism, and fighting spirit they had to leave everything here. They are at the Hotel Londres, Avda. Lavalle No. 400." The three boys referred to are Juan Diego Davila Basterrica, Jose Adolfo Moreno Vergara and Enrique Paul Barron, described above as "accomplices in absentia".

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